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THE INFLUENCE OF A DECADE OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION




VER the last two decades there has been a significant increase in
the number of scholarly articles published that examine basic
principles of statutory interpretation.1 Several different inter-
pretive approaches have been advanced, extensively elaborated, and criti-
qued.2 Much of this recent scholarship is of a rather theoretical and
abstract nature, drawing heavily upon sophisticated philosophical and lin-
guistic concepts. One therefore wonders whether it has had any discern-
able impact upon judicial practice, particularly in light of the declarations
made by both prominent jurists and leading practitioners that most cur-
rent legal scholarship is so dissociated from practical concerns that it has
very limited relevance for attorneys and judges, 3 and given recent studies
that suggest sharply declining rates of citation of law review articles in
judicial opinions.4
We now live, however, in an "age of statutes."'5 Since statutory inter-
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1 (1994).
2. The three dominant interpretive approaches are intentionalism, purposivism, and
textualism. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpreta-
tion as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 42 (1992); Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View
of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 320 (1989); Patricia Wald,
Teaching the Trade: An Appellate Judge's View of Practice Oriented Legal Education, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 35, 42 (1986); Ellen Peters, Reality and the Language of the Law, 90 YALE
Li. 1193, 1193 (1981). See also United States v. $639,558 in United States Currency, 955
F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J. concurring); Task Force on Law Schools and
the Profession, Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Contin-
uum, A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE B., at 5 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by
Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 684 (1998) ("The number of judicial
citations of law reviews in each of the courts surveyed [including federal courts and state
supreme courts] declined dramatically from 1975 to 1996"); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B.
Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34
UCLA L. REV. 131, 134 (1986) [hereinafter Citing of Law Reviews].
5. See, e.g., GuiDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES at 1-7
(1982).
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pretation is now central to the work of judges, one would think that they
would be more cognizant of and influenced by articles concerning theo-
ries of statutory interpretation than they might be by, say, more interdis-
ciplinary or postmodern fare. There is some evidence suggesting that this
is indeed the case.6 However, it would be useful to empirically test and
refine such intuitions in a more systematic fashion.
In order to better assess the influence of this recent scholarship upon
judges, I thought it reasonable to begin by first determining the frequency
with which statutory interpretation articles are cited in judicial opinions,
and then examining in more detail the character of the judicial citations,
at least for the more widely-cited articles. 7 In this study I will undertake
this effort for those statutory interpretation articles of a broad, theoretical
nature that were published during the 1988-97 decade in North American
law journals.8 There are a number of rather obvious reasons why the
results of this study can provide only a very crude assessment of the influ-
ence of this literature upon the judiciary.9 Nevertheless, one must start
6. See, e.g., Deborah Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and
Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871, 882-83
(1996) [hereinafter Judges and Scholars].
The articles on our "most cited" lists share an interest [with those articles
most cited by scholars] in statutory interpretation. At least six of.. .[our list
of the 30 most cited] articles outline general theories of statutory interpreta-
tion, including three of the five articles that overlap with Shapiro's [articles
most cited in law journals] list. The congruence of most-cited articles in this
field supports Judge Posner's observation that "statutory interpretation is an
area where the innovations come mainly from the academy."
Id.
7. I have elected to forego examination of judicial citation of recent treatises and
other full-length works that devote much of their analysis to statutory interpretation.
There are several significant recent works along this line that might be considered in subse-
quent studies for their influence upon judges. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREA-
TION OF PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 1995); ESKRIDGE, supra note 1.
A Lexis search done in early June, 1999, revealed that the Scalia book cited above had
been cited in fifteen judicial opinions. TWelve of these citations related to his discussions of
statutory interpretation issues. The Lexis search also revealed that the Eskridge and
Frickey casebook cited above had also been cited in fifteen opinions, again with twelve of
those citations relating to statutory interpretation issues. The Eskridge treatise cited above
has only been cited in one judicial opinion.
8. I chose the 1988-97 period because it is recent, and a long enough period of time to
contain a significant body of work and to allow for this work to come to the attention of
the judiciary, and yet it is still short enough to be analytically tractable.
9. First of all, while scholars have various professional incentives and obligations to
cite extensively to the relevant scholarly literature in their articles, judges do not operate
under quite the same incentives and constraints. Judicial opinions are, to a significant ex-
tent, advocacy pieces prepared to serve as a defense of a decision reached, rather than
comprehensive and balanced scholarly essays.
A judge may, for example, choose not to cite, in an opinion, an article that influenced his
analysis because his ruling is less ambiguously supported by case law or statutory authority.
He may also choose not to cite an article that he has read and seriously considered but that
takes a position opposed to that of his ruling; a luxury that is obviously not available to the
conscientious scholar. Finally, a judge might not be familiar with a particular article that
nevertheless might have a significant impact on the overall "climate of opinion" in legal
circles, as legal scholars publicize and explicate its arguments to a broader public, and this
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somewhere, and this seems a reasonable place to begin this inquiry.
At the outset, let me briefly summarize my conclusions. I have five
main observations to offer on the basis of this study. First, there has been
a very significant recent expansion in scholarship in this area; at least 132
articles were published over the past decade alone that address statutory
interpretation issues at a broad, theoretical level. Second, almost half of
the statutory interpretation articles published between 1988 and 1995
have been cited in at least one judicial opinion. While there is little com-
parative data available, what there is suggests that this is a relatively high
figure compared to the rate of judicial citation of scholarship produced in
other fields of law.
Third, at least seven statutory interpretation articles published during
the past decade have been rather extensively cited by the courts, and are
among the most judicially-cited legal articles published during this period.
Fourth, an examination of the nature of judicial citations to these seven
articles lends some support to the legal realist claim that scholarly journal
articles are generally (although not always) utilized by judges primarily to
add academic luster to decisions ultimately based on other grounds,
rather than as significant factors in the underlying decision-making pro-
cess. Finally, if a scholar seeks primarily to have his work provide imme-
diate practical assistance to practitioners and judges-and to be cited
extensively in their briefs and opinions-that person would be well ad-
vised to engage in close doctrinal analyses of actual, current cases, rather
than in broader and more speculative and/or interdisciplinary investiga-
tions of larger questions of social policy.
II. THE CITATION SURVEY
A. FREQUENCY OF JUDICIAL CITATION OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION ARTICLES
The group of articles that I examined for the frequency and character
of their citation in judicial opinions included as many articles as I could
locate that dealt primarily with statutory interpretation issues at a gen-
eral, theoretical level,10 and that were published during the 1988-1997
climate of opinion may have an important and unacknowledged indirect influence upon
that judge in a particular case. For these and other reasons, the extent to which articles are
cited by judges may understate their actual influence upon judicial practice.
On the other hand, it is possible that in some instances an article that is cited by a court
in support of a decision actually had no influence at all in the making of that decision, but
was simply marshaled after-the-fact in an advocate's fashion to lend support to a decision
already reached on another basis. To the extent that this is the case, the frequency of
judicial citation of scholarly articles would overstate, perhaps dramatically so, their actual
influence on the outcome of decisions. To one of a legal realist bent, the ascription of a
direct causal relationship between the cited legal authority and the outcome of a judicial
decision is highly problematic
10. From this group of articles that I investigated, I chose to exclude those journal
articles that focused primarily upon constitutional rather than statutory interpretation is-
sues. I also excluded those articles that primarily addressed statutory interpretation ques-
tions in the context of a particular law or related set of laws, rather than more generally. I
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decade either in one of the approximately 150 U.S. law journals that are
tracked by Shepard's Law Review Citations," or in one of the North
American law journals that is not included in the Shepard's volume. 12
The group of 132 articles that I identified as meeting that criterion is set
forth in Appendix I.
Table I below presents the data I obtained concerning the frequency of
judicial citation of these articles. 13
TABLE I
FREQUENCY OF CITATION OF THE 132 1988-97 STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION ARTICLES IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS
Number of Articles





4-9 5 ( 3.8%)
10-23 7 ( 5.3%)
did include, however, those articles that had a broad, theoretical statutory interpretation
focus, but which applied their reasoning primarily to assess the work of the courts of a
particular jurisdiction.
The determination as to which articles so qualify is inherently somewhat subjective, and
my list is admittedly vulnerable to the criticism that it is to some extent both over-and
under-inclusive. I do believe, however, that this group of articles is relatively comprehen-
sive, in terms of including virtually all significant U.S. journal scholarship that has been
done in this area over this period. It is also reasonably well defined in terms of the topical
limits applied to exclude those articles exploring primarily constitutional questions or in-
terpretative issues of narrower impact. I strongly believe that the results reached would
not be significantly altered if the group of articles considered were modified by making the
probably quite modest number of additions and/or deletions that another reasonable ob-
server might deem appropriate.
11. Shepard's Law Review Citations (1986 & Supp.).
12. The group of journals that are excluded from the Shepard's volume but included in
this study consists of the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, the Cardozo
Law Review, the Case Western Reserve Law Review, the Cornell Journal of Law and Public
Policy, the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, the Harvard Journal of Legislation,
the Journal of Law and Politics, the McGill Law Journal, the Seton Hall Legislation Jour-
nal, the Supreme Court Review, and the Tulane European & Civil Law Forum. These jour-
nals were included because they each contained one or more articles dealing with statutory
interpretation issues on a general, theoretical level during the 1988-97 period. I utilized the
Lexis service in late May, 1999 to identify subsequent court citations of the articles pub-
lished in these journals.
13. Both the Shepard's research and my Lexis research concerning articles not tracked
by Shepard's included all federal court (including bankruptcy court) and state court cita-
tions to the articles considered. The Shepard's citations were tracked through the service's
March, 1999 Cumulative Supplement volume, which is current through approximately the
end of 1998. Shepard's Law Review Citations viii (March 1999). The Lexis citations were
identified during late May, 1999, and are likely current through about the end of April,
1999.
I utilized the Lexis service to identify and correct a few inadvertent omissions from the
Shepard's list of court citations, but I did not use the service to update the Shepard's cita-
tions beyond those contained in their March, 1999, Cumulative Supplement volume.
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Let me briefly note some further statistical aspects of the survey
information summarized in Table I. 60.6% of the 132 statutory
interpretation articles published between 1988 and 1997 have never been
cited in a judicial opinion, and the remaining 39.4% of the articles have
each been cited at least one time. The fifty-two articles that each
received at least one judicial citation garnered a total of 197 citations,'14
and the average number of cites/article for the fifty-two cited articles is
therefore 3.8.
This overall average number of cites per cited article is somewhat
misleading, however, because it is dominated by the seven articles that
each received ten or more citations, and that collectively received over
one-half of all citations.15 The average number of cites/article for those
seven articles was 14.7. The remaining forty-five cited articles received
only an average of 2.1 cites/article.
TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ARTICLES
JUDICIALLY CITED BY YEAR OF PUBLICATION (1988-97)

































14. These 197 citations each represent a different opinion. I reviewed the Shepard's
and Lexis citation data to remove any duplicative citations to the same opinion from
different case reporters.
15. The seven most frequently cited 1988-97 statutory interpretation articles are:
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 845 (1992) (10 cites); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (11 cites); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (12 cites); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip
P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (10
cites); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175 (1989)
(16 cites); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071 (1990) (23 cites); and Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (21 cites).
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Table II above presents the percentage of articles that have received at
least one judicial citation, broken down by the article's year of
publication.
Table II clearly indicates that the earlier 1988-90 group of articles were
more frequently cited than the later 1991-95 articles, and that both of
these groups of articles were much more frequently cited than the more
recent 1996-97 articles. This could reflect the fact that the earlier
scholarship in this area is perceived as more seminal than the later work,
and consequently has had more influence upon the judiciary.
Alternatively, it could be partially or even wholly due to the simple fact
that the judges had more time to become aware of and reflect upon the
earlier work. This latter explanation seems particularly likely with regard
to those later contributions that did not appear in print until 1996 or 1997.
B. NATURE OF THE CITATIONS OF THE SEVEN MOST FREQUENTLY
CITED ARTICLES.
The following seven articles have each received at least ten judicial ci-
tations-and in some instances as many as twenty-one to twenty-three
citations-while none of the other cited articles received more than at
most eight citations:
1) Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992) (10 cites);
2) William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Inter-
pretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (11 cites);
3) William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990) (12 cites);
4) William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (10 cites);
5) Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989) (16 cites);
6) Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990) (23 cites); and
7) Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (21 cites).
By way of comparison of these judicial citation frequencies with those
of articles relating to other fields of law, a recent study by Deborah Mer-
ritt and Melanie Putnam16 examined the rate of judicial citation of all
articles published between 1989 and 1991 in leading law journals. They
found that articles (5) and (7) above were among the ten articles pub-
lished in 1989 that were most heavily cited by judicial opinions.17 In addi-
tion, they found that articles (4) and (6) were among the ten articles
published in 1990 most cited by judges,' 8 and that article (2) was among
16. See Judge and Scholars, supra note 6.
17. Id. at 899 (Table 1).
18. Id. at 900 (Table 2).
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the ten articles published in 1991 most cited by judges.1 9 One additional
statutory interpretation article published in 1990 was also found by Mer-
ritt and Putnam to be among the ten articles published that year that
were most heavily cited in judicial opinions.20 These are, therefore, un-
usually widely cited articles.
Let me conclude this descriptive portion of my study by briefly summa-
rizing, without comment, the general character of the judicial citations to
each of the seven above-listed articles. I will then discuss, at a more gen-
eral level, the conclusions I have drawn from this survey.
1. The Breyer Southern California Law Review Article.
The article by Justice Breyer-published in 1992 before his appoint-
ment to the U.S. Supreme Court-has been cited for a wide range of
rather general propositions concerning the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. For example, a couple of courts cited the article
in support of the broad statement that legislative history may occasionally
be an appropriate aid for statutory interpretation.21 Other courts cited
the article in support of the claim that the use of legislative history may
be particularly appropriate to determine the meaning of a specialized
phrase,2 2 or where resort to a literal reading of the statute would lead to
an absurd result.2 3 Four different courts have cited the Breyer article in
support of the proposition that legislative history is often unclear and un-
helpful.24 Finally, one court has cited the article for the proposition that
it is sometimes unnecessary to resort to legislative history to interpret a
statute,25 and another court cited it in support of the claim that the
Supreme Court appears to be increasingly reluctant to rely upon legisla-
tive history for guidance. 26
2. The Eskridge Yale Law Journal Article.
This 1991 article by William Eskridge has been extensively cited by
both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, primarily for his dis-
cussion of the frequency of and reasons for Congress overruling court
19. Id. at 901 (Table 3).
20. Id. at 900 (Table 2). This article was Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Inter-
section of Law and Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821 (1990). That article received eightjudicial citations, and it just fell short of making my "most cited" list of articles.
21. See Gaskell v. Harvard Coop. Soc'y, 3 F.3d 495, 499 (1st Cir. 1993); Strickland v.
Commissioner, Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 17 n.3 (1st Cir. 1995).
22. See Wyoming Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349, 1372 n.35 (D. Wyo.
1997).
23. See Unites States v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 748 (9th Cir. 1995).
24. See Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 117 (5th Cir. 1997); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 F.3d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1994); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Reich,
8 F.3d 980, 987 n.2 (4th Cir. 1993); Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 477 (9th Cir.
1993).
25. See Day v. United States, 682 A.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. App. 1996) (Mack, J.,
concurring).




decisions by statute .27 The article has also been cited once for the dis-
tinction he draws between congressional acts that overrule court deci-
sions and those that merely clarify ambiguous statutes,2 8 once for his
discussion of the "originalism-present intent" debate,2 9 and once for the
support he offers for critics of the "plain meaning" interpretive
approach. 30
3. The Eskridge UCLA Law Review Article.
The subsequent 1992 Eskridge article has been cited for a wide range
of propositions concerning statutory interpretation. First, a couple of ci-
tations merely note without comment Eskridge's active participation in
the debate over statutory interpretation 3' and the "new textualism. ' '32
Two other courts cite him for his observation that the Supreme Court is
currently tending towards literal readings of statutes.33 One additional
court cites him generally for his outline of Justice Scalia's theory of statu-
tory interpretation, 34 while another simply notes without comment his
coining of the term "legisprudence. ' '35
Along more substantive lines, this Eskridge article has also been cited
for his observations that the meaning of a statutory text depends critically
upon its context,36 that committee reports are the most frequently cited
and authoritative source of legislative history,37 that most judicial statu-
tory interpretation decisions are forced by deliberate statutory ambigu-
ity,38 that statutes with common purposes should be similarly construed,39
that legislative history can be manipulated to support almost any proposi-
tion,40 that legislatures usually have no concrete expectations about many
27. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 212 (1996); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511
U.S. 298, 305 (1994); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 46 (1992); Mojica v.
Gannett Co., 7 F.3d 552, 567 (7th Cir. 1993); Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564,
1569 (9th Cir. 1993); NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 300 (7th Cir.
1992); Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 880
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
28. See United States v. Soderling, 970 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1992).
29. Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 303 (5th Cir. 1994).
30. Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 818 F. Supp. 623, 628 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
31. See Arenjay Corp. v. Comm'r, 920 F.2d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 1991).
32. Raritan Dev. Corp. v. Silva, 689 N.E.2d 1373, 1378 (N.Y. 1997).
33. See Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490, 493 (7th Cir.
1993); Jones Constr. Co. v. Superior Court of Orange County, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1568, 1574
(Cal. App. 1994).
34. See Virginia Vermiculite v. W.R. Grace & Co., 965 F. Supp. 802, 812 (W.D. Va.
1997).
35. Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1045(Wyo. 1993).
36. See Vinton v. Trustbank Say., 798 F. Supp. 1055, 1067 (D. Del. 1992).
37. See Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 641 (10th Cir. 1998).
38. See Fremont Compensation Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 4th 867, 874 (Cal.
App. 1996).
39. See Michigan Ass'n of Intermediate Special Educ. Adm'rs v. Department of Soc.
Servs., 526 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Mich. App. 1994).
40. See Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Nebraska Dep't of Revenue, 537 N.W.2d 312, 322
(Nb. 1995) (Caporale, J., concurring).
[Vol. 53
20001 DECADE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 17
of the issues their statutes will later pose, 41 and that the Supreme Court
now routinely resorts to legislative history in interpreting statutes.42
4. The Eskridge and Frickey Stanford Law Review Article.
The 1990 Eskridge and Frickey article has also been cited in support of
a number of very general propositions about statutory interpretation. For
example, it has been cited in support of the assertion that numerous theo-
ries of statutory interpretation exist,43 as a source of "sound statutory
hermeneutics," 44 and for the claim that courts may utilize information
from a variety of sources, including legislative history, when engaging in
statutory interpretation.45 It has been cited in support of courts using
extrinsic aids as well as statutory text in statutory interpretation,46 and for
the view that "textualism" should control statutory interpretation only if
the text offers a complete and reasonably determinate source of
meaning. 47
This article has also been cited, however, in support of the somewhat
conflicting propositions that statutory interpretation must be attentive to
statutory text, because that is all that has been formally enacted into
law, 48 and that one must be particularly cautious when relying upon fed-
eral legislative history for interpretive guidance. 49 Finally, the article has
been cited for the claims that the "purposive" approach is the traditional
method of statutory interpretation,50 and that the Supreme Court has his-
torically adhered to a "modest approach" to statutory interpretation that
is grounded in "practical reason." 51
5. The Scalia University of Chicago Law Review Article.
The 1989 Scalia article has been extensively cited in support of several
broad propositions. First, a number of courts cited this article as support
for courts giving great weight to the clarity and certainty advantages of
bright-line interpretations of rules. 52 Second, Scalia is cited as a sup-
41. See Township of Holmdel v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 617 A.2d 656, 658 (N.J. 1992).
42. See Parker Land & Cattle Co., 845 P.2d at 1050.
43. See UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 911 F.2d 654, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
44. In re Nadler, 122 B.R. 162, 169 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
45. See United States v. Torres, 857 F. Supp. 168, 174 (D. Puerto Rico 1994); Schmidt
v. Department of Educ., 490 N.W.2d 584, 596 (Mich. 1992).
46. See Wisconsin v. Sample, 573 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1997) (Abrahamson, J.,
concurring).
47. See Queen v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 481 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
48. See Klein Bancorporation v. Comm'r of Revenue, 581 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998).
49. See Mortier v. Town of Casey, 452 N.W.2d 555, 564 (Wis. 1990) (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
50. See United States v. Bazel, 80 F.3d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1996).
51. LaGuire v. Kain, 487 N.W.2d 389, 398 (Mich. 1992) (Boyle, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
52. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1320 (3rd Cir. 1994); Act UpliPortland
v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 1993); American Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Board of
Trade, 977 F.2d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 504 (7th
Cir. 1992); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 425 (3rd Cir. 1991); Ross v. Creighton
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porter of the rule of law 53 and the need for standards to constrain judicial
power.54 Third, he is cited for the proposition that questions of fact at
their margin often shade into questions of law. 55 Fourth, the article is
cited by two courts in support of adherence to established precedents and
principles.56 Finally, one court has cited the article in support of the posi-
tion that courts should be reluctant to apply a rule that does not seem to
extend beyond the facts of the instant case. 57
6. The Sunstein Columbia Law Review Article
The 1990 Sunstein article has received more judicial citations than any
of the other articles considered in this study. The U.S. Supreme Court
cited the piece several times: once for the proposition that the resolution
of statutory ambiguity is more often a question of policy than of law,58
once in support of the claim that it is not always reasonable to give legal
effect to mere implications from statutory language,59 and once for the
statement that it is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend for
courts to uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes when those
interpretations raise serious constitutional doubts.60
This Sunstein article has also been cited extensively by lower federal
courts with regard to various issues centered around the proper degree of
deference that courts should give agency actions under the principles set
down in 1984 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.61 The article has been cited not only for its exten-
sive general discussion of the implications of Chevron,62 but also for a
large number of more specific Chevron-related propositions: that the ra-
tionality standard of review is necessarily deferential, 63 that regulation
cannot be carried out solely through detailed legislation that leaves regu-
latory agencies little or no interpretive flexibility,64 that courts should not
defer to agency interpretations when the issue is the breadth of the
Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1330 (N.D. I11. 1990); In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131
F.R.D. 688, 695 (N.D. Ca. 1990); In re Victoria Ltd. Partnership, 187 B.R. 54, 61 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1995).
53. See Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko, 513 N.W.2d 773, 782 (Mich. 1994).
54. See Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Felix, 571 N.E.2d 287, 291 (Ind. 1991).
55. See Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 924 F. Supp. 613, 616 (D. Del. 1996); Reed v.
Central Soya Co., 644 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ind. 1994).
56. See In re the Marriage of John Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Iowa 1995) (Fer-
ins, J., dissenting); People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 1001 (Cal. 1991).
57. See United States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
58. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991).
59. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); see also Johns v. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 1050, 1054
(E.D. Tex. 1993).
60. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 207 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
62. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213,
1226 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., concurring).
63. See New York State Ass'n of Counties v. Axelrod, 577 N.E.2d 16, 23 (N.Y. 1991)(Hancock, J., dissenting).
64. See Sherman v. Citibank, 668 A.2d 1036, 1058 (N.J. 1995).
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agency's area of regulation, 65 that it is dubious to infer specific legislative
intent from legislative silence,66 and that legislative history or other
sources of background information may be sufficient to foreclose reliance
upon contrary agency interpretations. 67
Additionally, the article has been cited for the Chevron-related pro-
positions: that the courts should grant less deference to agency interpreta-
tions of their own ambiguously worded regulations,68 that a prior history
of consistent agency interpretation does not always counsel deference to
agency action,69 that the applicability of the Chevron principles should
not be determined based upon an ad hoc determination of administrative
competence, 70 that Chevron principles may not apply when an agency
with rule-making authority has not promulgated an on-point rule,71 that
Chevron principles should only apply to agency interpretations pursuant
to legislative rulemaking,72 that Chevron calls for deference to agency ac-
tions based upon specialized agency knowledge, 73 and that deference to
agency interpretations under Chevron is appropriate absent contrary con-
gressional direction.74
7. The Sunstein Harvard Law Review Article
This second, earlier Sunstein article has been extensively cited for a
large number of broad, general propositions relating to statutory inter-
pretation. These propositions include: that historical practice is relevant
for statutory interpretation,75 that the plain meaning approach to statu-
tory interpretation is unhelpful when the context of the statute produces
interpretive doubt, 76 that interpreting statutes is difficult,77 that plain
meaning interpretation is essential under the Administrative Procedures
65. See Fleischmann v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp., 137 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir.
1998); Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 998 (11th Cir. 1996); Garrelts v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 943 F. Supp. 1023, 1042, 1049 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Blagden Alley Ass'n v. District of
Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 590 A.2d 139, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
66. See United States v. Barber, 93 F.3d 1200, 1211 (4th Cir. 1996); Lancashire Coal
Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 968 F.2d 388, 393 (3rd Cir. 1992); Caterpillar Inc. v. United
States, 941 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
67. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816, 830-31 n.21 (10th
Cir. 1997); Osorio v. I.N.S., 18 F.3d 1017, 1022 (2d Cir. 1994); International Union, UAW v.
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
68. See Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 453 n.13 (3rd Cir. 1994).
69. See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 446 (7th Cir.
1994).
70. See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 878 (4th Cir. 1996).
71. See Georgia Dep't of Med. Assistance v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1565, 1571 (11th Cir.
1993).
72. See International Raw Materials v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 978 F.2d 1318, 1325 (3rd
Cir. 1992).
73. See United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 729 (3d Cir. 1993).
74. See Air N. Am. v. Department of Transp., 937 F.2d 1427, 1436 (9th Cir. 1991).
75. See BHP Petroleum Co. v. State, 784 P.2d 621, 626 n.6 (Wyo. 1989).
76. See Minneapolis Police Officers Feder. v. City of Minneapolis, 481 N.W.2d 372, 374
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Queen v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 481 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).
77. See Gay v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Act scheme, 78 that flexible statutory interpretation is appropriate under
some circumstances, 79 that finding congressional intent with regard to
"feasible" or "probable" agency determinations is unlikely,80 that strong
substantive background norms may control statutory interpretation, 81
and that courts do not always need to defer to an agency's interpretation
of the law.82
This article has been further cited for its general discussion of statutory
interpretation principles,8 3 as well as for the following specific proposi-
tions: that a statutory ambiguity is not a delegation of law-making author-
ity to an agency,84 that "absent a clear indication... Congress should not
be presumed to have intended ... an irrational and unjust result," 85 that
courts should be more aggressive and creative in their interpretations
when conventional interpretive techniques lead to absurd or unjust re-
suits,8 6 that "shared understandings" should be important in statutory in-
terpretation,8 7 that deferring to longstanding interpretations helps to
promote certainty and predictability,88 and that statutes should be con-
strued whenever possible to avoid constitutional infirmities.8 9
III. DISCUSSION
I learned several things from this research. First, I was surprised to find
out just how extensive a body of theoretical statutory interpretation
scholarship has been produced during the past decade. 90 This work rep-
resents quite a substantial commitment of scholarly effort over this
period.
An interesting and somewhat surprising statistic that has emerged from
this study is that 46.4% of the 110 theoretically-oriented statutory inter-
pretation articles were published between 1988 and 1995 have been cited
in at least one judicial opinion.91 This strikes me as a very high citation
percentage. I admit that I. am unaware of any comparative citation per-
78. See Exportal Ltda. v. United States, 902 F.2d 45, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
79. See Delta Traffic Serv., Inc. v. Transtop, Inc., 902 F.2d 101, 111 (1st Cir. 1990).
80. See Friends of Boundry Waters Wilderness v. Robertson, 978 F.2d 1484, 1490 (8th
Cir. 1992).
81. See Railway Labor Executives Assoc. v. National Mediation Bd., 988 F.2d 133, 144
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
82. See Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1022 (2d Cir. 1994).
83. See United States v. Torres, 857 F. Supp. 168, 174 n.15 (D. P.R. 1994); Krieger v.
Trane Co., 765 F. Supp. 756, 758 (D.D.C. 1991); Local 300, Nat'l Postal Mail Handlers
Union v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 764 F. Supp. 199, 205 (D.D.C. 1991); In Re
Nadler, 122 B.R. 162, 170 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
84. See Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 196, 197 n.16 (3rd Cir.
1995).
85. See TMG II v. U.S., 778 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D.D.C. 1991).
86. See In re Uncle Bud's, Inc., 206 B.R. 889, 899 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1997).
87. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1247 (N.J. 1990).
88. See Schulte Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 882 P.2d 65, 68 (Okla. 1994).
89. See Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990).
90. See Appendix I for a listing of 132 such articles published between 1988 and 1997.
91. See supra Table II.
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centages calculated for any other fields of law. 92 But given the numerous
critiques offered by prominent judges as to the infrequency with which
they find the journal literature useful in their work,93 and given the fact
that recent research indicates a significant decline in the rate at which
court opinions cite scholarly articles, 94 my strong suspicion is that this
citation percentage is a relatively high figure compared to overall law
journal article citation frequencies. One would think that the statutory
interpretation literature would be of particular interest to judges, given
the difficult interpretive demands now placed upon them. The fact that
Merritt and Putnam found that their 1989 through 1991 annual lists of the
ten published articles most heavily cited by judges included an average of
two theoretical statutory interpretation articles95 among those ten arti-
cles, lends further support to this intuition.
The identity of the seven statutory interpretation articles that emerged
as the most judicially-cited works during the past decade was no real sur-
prise. Their five authors, two sitting Supreme Court Justices and three
leading scholars, all maintain great credibility in the profession. After
looking over each of the 100+ judicial citations to one or another of these
articles, I have several thoughts to offer concerning the roles those arti-
cles may have played in the judicial decision-making process.
One observation I will make is that the great majority of the citations
appear to have been included in the opinions simply to lend academic
support to the application of a standard, straightforward principle of stat-
utory interpretation that was referred to generally and superficially by
the article, and that was well-established long before the publication of
that article. The articles were rarely cited for their more original, subtle,
or controversial claims, and were also rarely cited in contexts that would
suggest that they had been particularly useful in helping the court to deal
with a complex interpretive issue that did not fit comfortably within the
ambit of any of the conventional maxims of statutory interpretation-the
usual situation facing appellate judges! These citations instead suggest
that the articles were generally marshalled after-the-fact during the writ-
ing of the opinion to lend further support to a decision already reached
on other grounds, rather than being influential on their own account in
determining which of the conflicting policy objectives underlying the dif-
ferent interpretive approaches should take precedence in the making of
that decision.
That being said, one can still find a few opinions that cite to some of
the more original contributions or more subtle and nuanced discussions
92. There is, however, some evidence that judges do not now cite to the scholarly
literature as often as they did in the recent past. See McClintock, supra note 4, at 684
(finding a 47.35% decline in overall federal court and state supreme court law journal
citations from 1975 to 1996); Citing of Law Reviews, supra note 4, at 134 (finding a 20%
decline in U.S. Supreme Court citations of law journal articles from 1971-73 to 1981-83).
93. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
95. See Judges and Scholars, supra note 6, at 899-901.
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contained in some of the articles. 96 This suggests that at least a few courts
have seriously reflected upon some of this body of scholarly work, and
may even have been influenced by it to some extent. In particular, a
number of courts appear to have found the 1990 Columbia Law Review
article by Cass Sunstein,97 which analyzes the implications of the Chevron
case, to be of substantial assistance in understanding the scope and re-
quirements of that important Supreme Court decision. The Sunstein arti-
cle has been cited not only for its succinct statements of general
interpretive principles,98 but also for its ruminations on the proper appli-
cation of those principles under various specific circumstances under the
Chevron directives. 99 This article seems to better embody what judges
(and practicing lawyers) apparently desire of legal scholarship than any of
the other articles considered in this study: sophisticated theoretical analy-
sis involving basic policy issues, but conducted using conventional legal
categories and forms of argument, and grounded in very specific factual
contexts that closely resemble the controversies with which courts regu-
larly deal.
Stated another way, the more a law journal article resembles the tradi-
tional "casenote" or close doctrinal analysis of a line of cases-literary
genres that have largely fallen from favor in legal academia in recent de-
cades-the more helpful it is likely to be to practitioners and judges in
their day-to-day activities, at least with regard to providing them with an
academic patina for their briefs and opinions. Those legal scholars who
first and foremost desire to have their research provide such immediate
practical assistance to practitioners and courts, as opposed to conceiving
of their central scholarly mission in different terms,100 would be well ad-
vised to select their topics and expositional styles with this consideration
in mind.
96. For example, the comprehensive statistics and analysis relating to congressional
overruling of court decisions by statute that was provided by William Eskridge in his 1991
Yale Law Journal article has apparently proved informative and helpful to a number of
courts. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. As another example, several of the
citations to the 1989 Scalia University of Chicago Law Review article refer to positions he
takes that are both subtle and highly contested. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying
text.
97. Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071
(1990).
98. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
100. For a recent general overview of the ongoing debate among academics, practition-
ers, and judges over the appropriate role of legal scholarship, see generally McClintock,
supra note 4, at 667-82.
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APPENDIX I: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ARTICLES
(1988-97)
Donna D. Adler, A Conversational Approach to Statutory Analysis: Say
What You Mean & Mean What You Say, 66 Miss. L.J. 37 (1996).
Shirley S. Abrahmson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for
Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045
(1991).
Larry Alexander, On Statutory Interpretation: Fancy Theories of Inter-
pretation Aren't, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1081 (1995).
T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoher-
ence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals,
Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 687 (1992).
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 20 (1988).
Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legisla-
tive Process: Can it be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL. 105
(1997).
Steven Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Stat-
utes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992).
James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpreta-
tion of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1994).
Winfried Brugger, Concretization of Law and Statutory Interpretation,
11 TUL. EUR. & CIv. L.F. 207 (1996).
Roger Colinvaux, What is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good
Judging Under a Textualist Lens, 72 IND. L.J. 1133 (1997).
Edwin 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy,
42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1129 (1992).
George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other 'Benign Fic-
tions': The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and
Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39 (1990).
Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE
L.J. 1561 (1994).
Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
64 U. CIN. L. REV. 911 (1996).
Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices
Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin
State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 161 (1996).
Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defin-
ing the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 127 (1994).
Frank Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994).
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Frank Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 441 (1990).
Frank Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988).
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 13
(1995).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twenti-
eth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1731 (1993).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpre-
tation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Con-
gress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 609 (1990).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 365 (1990).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J.
319 (1989).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV.
275(1988).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J.
1361 (1988).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 67 (1988).
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term-Foreward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
Daniel A. Farber, Legal Realism and Legal Process: Statutory Interpre-
tation and the Idea of Progress, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1546 (1996).
Daniel A. Farber, The Hermeneutical Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in
Comparative Perspective, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 513 (1996).
Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, For-
malism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992).
Daniel A. Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil Rights, Environmental
Law, and Statutory Interpretation After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiv-
ing the Regulatory State, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 676 (1991).
Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 667 (1991).
[Vol. 53
2000] DECADE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 25
Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy,
78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989).
Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and
Civil Rights, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2 (1988).
Daniel A. Farber & Phillip Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988).
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
Phillip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085
(1995).
Phillip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of
Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992).
Phillip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
A. Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legis-
prudence and the New Legal Process, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1071 (1988).
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Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L.
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Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for
Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (1991).
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John F. Manning, Textualism as a Non-Delegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 673 (1997).
Lawrence C. Marshall, Construction and Judicial Constraints: A Re-
sponse to Macey and Miller, 45 VAND. L. REV. 673 (1992).
Lawrence C. Marshall, 'Let Congress Do It': The Case for an Absolute
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989).
Lawrence C. Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of
an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2467 (1990).
Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand The-
ories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1993).
Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation
of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827 (1991).
Brent McDonnell, Dynamic Statutory Interpretations and Sluggish So-
cial Movements, 85 CAL. L. REV. 99 (1997).
Julian B. McDonnell, Definition and Dialogue in Commercial Law, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 623 (1995).
R. Shep Melnick, Statutory Reconstruction: The Politics of Eskridge's
Interpretation, 84 GEO. L.J. 91 (1995).
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
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